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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction of the crime
of aggravated assault in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-5-103 (1953), as amended.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Appellant was found guilty of the crime of aggravated
assault before the Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen, District
Judge, presiding

without a jury. Appellant was sentenced to

the Utah State Prison for a term not to exceed five years.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an affirmance of the lower
court decision,
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On March 16, 1975, the appellant and Gene Earl
Bunderson left Mrc Bunderson1s home and went to a tavern
called Murphfs to shoot some pool and have a few beers
(T.6).

The appellant and Mr. Bunderson had approximately

seven or eight glasses of beer a piece before they left
the tavern around 10:00 p.m.

Mr. Bunderson then gave the

appellant a ride to where his truck was located.

Mr*

Bunderson then entered his own home, took two cans of
beer out of the refrigerator to take up the street to
where the appellant was staying to finish out the evening
(T.15).
Mr. Bunderson pulled his car behind the appellant's
truck and got out of his car (T.15)*

Mr. Bunderson approached

the appellant and was in the process of handing him. a beer
when the appellant beat Mr. Bunderson about the face and body
with a metal pipe (T.16).

As a result, Mr. Bunderson was

severely injured (Exhibits 1, 2). Before trial the appellant
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went through psychiatric examinations•

Based upon the

medical reports, the judge, sitting as trier of fact f
determined that the appellant was sane and responsible at
the time of the incident in question (T.127).
On the basis of the reports, the trial judge
ruled that the appellant did not suffer a mental defect
and that intoxication could not be a defense to a crime
of this nature.

Respondent urges that the lower court

decision be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT IS A CRIME OF GENERAL INTENT,
*

NOT SPECIFIC INTENT; THEREFORE, INTOXICATION OF THE
DEFENDANT CANNOT BE USED AS A DEFENSE.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1953), as amended,
states:
11

(1) A person commits aggravated
assault if he commits assault as
defined in § 76-5-102 and:
(A) He intentionally causes
serious bodily injury to another or
(B) He uses a deadly weapon
or such means or force likely to
produce death or serious bodily
injury."

-3Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The definition referred to in Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102
(1953), as amended, is:
3

'(1) Assault is; (a) An attempt,
with unlawful force or violence, to do
bodily injury to another; or (b) A
threat, accompanied by a show of
immediate force or violence, to do
bodily injury to another. (2) Assault
is a class B misdemeanor."
Respondent submits that the crime of aggravated
assault as stated by Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1953), as
amended, is a crime which requires only a general intent and
therefore, intoxication does not negate such intent.
Traditionally, simply assault and assault with a
deadly weapon have been referred to as "general intent"
«•

crimes.

People v. Wingo, 121 Cal.Rptr. 97, 534 P.2d 1001

(1975); People v. Morrow, 74 Cal.Rptr. 551 (1969); People
v. Sandoval, 35 Cal.Rptr. 227 (1963).
In State v. Jamison, 110 Ariz< 245, 517 P.2d 1241
(1974), defendant was convicted of aggravated assault.

On

appeal, defendant contended that the crime of aggravated
assault is a crime that requires specific as opposed to
general intent.

The Court held:

"General criminal intent is implied
from the act itself while specific intent
is not. In the instant case we believe that
the crime of assault of a police officer is
a crime of general intent*" Id. at 1244.
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The Court went on further to state:
"In general intent cases/ once
the commission of the crime has
been shown the absence of general
intent may be shown by the defendant,
but this is the defendants burden
and voluntary intoxication will
not negate general intent." Id,, at
1244.
In People v. Rocha, 92 Cal.Rptr. 172, 479 P.2d 372
(1971), the defendant was convicted of assault with a deadly
weapon and asserted as error that the crime of assault with
a deadly weapon was a crime which required a specific intent.
Therefore, his intoxication could be introduced to negate
the element of intent.

The Court held that assault with a

deadly weapon is a general intent crime.
tion could not negate such intent.

Therefore, intoxica-

The Court went further

to state:
"[T]he criminal intent which is
required for assault with a deadly
weapon . . . is the general intent
to wilfully commit an act the direct,
natural and probable consequences of
which if successfully completed would
be the injury to another. Given that
intent it is immaterial whether or not
the defendant intended to violate the
law or knew that his conduct was
unlawful. The intent to cause any
particular injury. . .to severely
injure another, or to injure in the
sense of inflicting bodily harm, is
not necessary." Id. at 376,377.
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In the instant case, the appellant, with a 36
inch long pipe in hand, proceeded to beat the victim about
the face, ribs and legs (T.15,16).

The result was a split

in the victim1s lip extending to the tip of the nose
(Exhibits 1,2). Since alcohol is so often a factor in
inducing simple assaults and aggravated assaults, it would
be anomalous to permit exculpation because of intoxication.
The crime of aggravated assault in Utah is a crime
of general intent, not specific intent? therefore, intoxication is not a defense.

The long-standing rule in Utah has

always been that in criminal cases a person is presumed to
intend the natural and probable consequences of his unlawful
acts.

Uintah Freight Lines v. Public Service Commission,

119 Utah 491, 229 P.2d 675 (1951).
In the instant case, the State proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that the appellant wilfully used unlawful
force upon the victim causing severe injury (T.4-25, Exhibits
1,2).
As stated in People v. Rocha, supra;
"[I]t would be anomalous to allow
evidence of intoxication to relieve a
man of responsibility for the crimes of
assault with a deadly weapon or simple
assault which are so frequently committed
in just such a manner.'1 Id. at 374.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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POINT II
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 (1953), AS AMENDED,
WHICH PROVIDES THAT A MENTAL DISEASE OR DEFECT IS A DEFENSE
TO A CRIMINAL CHARGE, IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE FACTS OF
THIS CASE.
The appellant in this case was subjected to
psychiatric examinations.

Judge VeNoy Christoffersen,

sitting as the trier of fact, determined from two medical
reports that there was no doubt that the appellant was
sane and responsible at the time of the incident in
question.

Judge Christoffersen stated:
"Well, I've read both reports and
studied both of them. I think that
they have pretty well answered the
questions you raise and state with a
great deal of specificity what they
feel the problem is. First of all
Dr. Wheelwright stated that there's
no question in his mind that he's
sane, responsible at the time of the
incident in question, with the
exception of intoxication. . . And
Dr. Fox states essentially the same
thing only goes into it a little
further. . . And to me that is not
a legal defense and I think that's
exactly what the doctors have told
us. . . ." (T.127).
The Judge as the trier of fact sits in the best

position to view the evidence.

-7-

In the instant case, there
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was sufficient evidence for the trial court to determine
that appellant was not the victim of a mental disease or
defect at the time of the incident in question.

That

trial court decision is entitled to a presumption of
validity and should only be disturbed in cases where the
record is clearly void of evidence to support such findings.
Latimer v. Katz, 29 Utah 2d 280, 508 P.2d 542 (1973).
Utah Code Ann* § 76-2-305 (1953), as amended,
states the following:
"Mental disease or defect—(1)
In any prosecution for an offense,
it shall be a defense that the
defendant, at the time of the
proscribed conduct, as a result of
mental disease or defect, lacked
substantial capacity either to
appreciate the wrongfulness of his
conduct or to conform his conduct
to the requirements of law.
(2) As used in this section,
the terms "mental disease1 or
s
defect' do not include an
abnormality manifested only be
repeated criminal or otherwise
antisocial conduct."
In this case it is the finding of the trier of
fact and the conclusion of the medical reports that the
episodes in question arose because of the appellant's
excessive use of alcohol and drugs (T.127).
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Subparagraph (2) of Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305
(1953), as amended, clearly states that the terms "mental
disease" or "defect" do not include abnormalities resulting
from repeated criminal or antisocial conduct.

Judge

Christoffersen, based upon the medical reports,found that
appellant's behavior was caused by excessive use of alcohol.
Therefore, appellant's alleged mental defect does not meet
the definition under subparagraph (2) of Section 76-2-305.
It was concluded that the defect was the result of repeated
criminal or antisocial conduct; therefore, it is not a defense.
As stated by Judge Christoffersen:

#

"THE COURTs Subparagraph two,
if that is the defect, it certainly
is a result of repeated criminal or
otherwise antisocial conduct, and that
is the taking of drugs. It therefore
does not become a defense; would find
the defendant guilty." (Lines 18-21,
T.128).
The Utah Supreme Court in reviewing the record of
this case must assume that the trial judge believed and
regarded as important and persuasive the evidence and all
reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom which
supported his findings and judgment.

Chatterley v. Omnico,

26 Utah 2d 88, 485 P.2d 667 (1971).
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In State v. Brantley, 11 Wash.App. 716, 525 P,2d
813, 815 (1974), the defendant challenged his conviction
on the grounds of insanity and diminished capacity as a
result of intoxication.

The Court stated:

"It is clearly the law and
defendant does not contend otherwise that mental irresponsibility
induced by voluntary intoxication
does not raise the defense of
insanity."
In the instant case, the findings and judgment
of the lower court as trier of fact should be affirmed.
POINT III
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-306 (1953), AS AMENDED, IS
NOT APPLICABLE TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE BECAUSE AGGRAVATED
ASSAULT IS A CRIME OF GENERAL INTENT,NOT SPECIFIC INTENT.
Aggravated assault is a crime that requires a
general intent, not a specific intent.

Therefore, intoxica-

tion cannot negate such intent.
In People v. Parks, 95 Cal.Rptr. 193, 485 P*2d
257 (1971), the defendant was convicted of assault with
a deadly weapon and asserted intoxication as a defense.
The Court held that the requisite general intent for
assault with a deadly weapon and any of the lesser assaults
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included therein may not be negated through a showing of
voluntary intoxication.

See also People v. Rocha, supra.

It is clear that the acts of the defendant
provided the requisite general intent to convict him of
the crime charged.

The defendant with a metal pipe beat

the victim about the face, ribs, and legs and caused severe
damage (T.15-16, Exhibits 1,2).
The Utah Supreme Court is entitled to presume
that the findings of fact and judgment of the lower court
are correct unless said judgment is in error by material
uncontroverted evidence.
499 P.2d 124 (1972).

Horman v. Lloyd, 28 Utah 2d 112,

Respondent respectfully submits that

Section 76-2-306 is not applicable to the instant case,
because intoxication cannot negate a crime that requires a
general intent.
CONCLUSION
Respondent respectfully submits that the crime
of aggravated assault is a crime which requires a general
culpable intent,not a specific intent.

It is clear that

crimes requiring only general intent do not have the
defense of intoxication.

Therefore, voluntary intoxication

cannot be used to negate that general intent.

-11-

Under the
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<

facts of this case, in light of the reports of Doctors
Wheelwright and Fox, the appellant failed to meet the
threshold of insanity required by the Utah Code.
Respondent respectfully submits that all
findings of fact and conclusions of law found by the
trial court judge be viewed in a favorable light and
affirmed.
Respectfully

submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General

EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
i
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